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Macroeconomic Volatilities and the Labor Market: 
First Results from the Euro Experiment
* 
 
This paper analyzes the effects of different labor market institutions on inflation and output 
volatility. The eurozone offers an unprecedented experiment for this exercise: since 1999, no 
national monetary policies have been implemented that could account for volatility 
differences across member states, but labor market characteristics have remained very 
diverse. We use a New Keynesian model with unemployment to predict the effects of 
different labor market institutions on macroeconomic volatilities. In our subsequent empirical 
estimations, we find that higher labor turnover costs have a statistically significant negative 
effect on output volatility, while replacement rates have a positive effect, both of which are in 
line with theory. While labor market institutions have a large effect on output volatility, they do 
not seem to have much of an effect on inflation volatility, which can also be rationalized by 
our theoretical model. 
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What are the eects of dierent labor market institutions on the volatility of macroeconomic
variables (macroeconomic volatilities henceforth), such as ination and output? With risk
averse agents and ination costs, the answer to this question has important welfare and policy
implications. It is highly relevant both for the (optimal) design of labor market institutions
and for (optimal) scal and monetary policy. Further, it sheds light on the question which
institutions should be integrated into labor market and business cycle models. There is a broad
theoretical literature that touches this issue indirectly and a very recent empirical cross-country
literature dealing with it more directly.1 However, so far there is no generally accepted view
on the eect of labor market institutions on macroeconomic volatilities. We will argue below
that the eurozone oers an unprecedented and so far largely unexplored experiment to analyze
this question empirically.
The existing macro labor theory, which is centered around the search and matching model,
indirectly touches the question how dierent labor market institutions aect macroeconomic
volatilities. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) show that a high value of leisure (i.e., more gen-
erous unemployment benets) increases the volatility of labor market variables in the search
and matching model. Hall (2005) shows that real wage rigidities also have a positive eect on
the volatility of labor market variables.2 These papers are very insightful from a theoretical
point of view, but they cannot make any predictions on ination volatility, as they assume per-
fectly exible prices. Further, they do not tackle the empirical question whether labor market
institutions actually aect macroeconomic volatilities, as predicted by the models.
There is a recent empirical cross-country literature (Abbritti and Weber (2008), Rumler and
Scharler (2009)) that directly analyzes the eects of labor market institutions on macroeconomic
volatilities. However, it suers from two problems. (i) When two countries are hit by dierent
macroeconomic shocks, macroeconomic volatilities would dier, even though they may have
exactly the same labor market institutions.3 (ii) Even when two countries are hit by the
same shocks and when they have the same labor market institutions, dierent monetary policy
reactions may lead to completely dierent macroeconomic volatilities (see, e.g., Blanchard and
Gal  (2007), and an illustrative example later in this paper).
Our own paper is complementary to the above, while circumventing the two problems of
cross-country studies, by making use of a natural experiment, the eurozone, whose members
have substantially dierent labor market institutions. However, since 1999, the twelve founding
states have been subject to the same monetary policy, and thus, dierences in macroeconomic
volatilities cannot be attributed to this factor. In addition, business cycles within the eurozone
have shown a substantial synchronization. While there are countries like Ireland that have
had a better growth performance, periods of high and low growth have been very similar in
the entire eurozone.4 Therefore, after 10 years of existence, the eurozone provides an excellent
1Note that our paper focuses on business cycle volatility, while there is a broad literature on growth volatility
(see, e.g., Klomp and de Haan, 2009, for a recent empirical contribution), which we will not touch.
2This literature was initiated by Costain and Reiter (2008) and Shimer (2005). All these papers discuss the
ability of the search and matching model to replicate the volatility of labor market variables (e.g., unemployment,
vacancies and the job nding rate). In contrast, we focus on output volatility for empirical reasons. The quality
of output data in the eurozone is much better than the quality of employment data (due to structural breaks,
comparability problems, etc.). It can, however, be shown in our model simulations that labor market institutions
have the same qualitative eects on employment and output volatilities.
3Abbritti and Weber circumenvent this rst problem in the most recent draft of their paper, by employing
a panel Vectorautoregression approach.
4For instance, Benalal et al. (2006) write that while there remains some dispersion of real GDP growth rates,
"the degree of synchronisation of business cycles across the euro area countries seems to have increased since
the beginning of the 1990s, [and] the degree of correlation currently appears to be at an historic high" (p. 4).
2opportunity, largely unexplored so far,5 to learn more about the eects of dierent labor market
institutions. We are well aware that the euro experiment also suers from some shortcomings,
such as the short observation period and the limited number of member states. However, we
think that our approach generates interesting new insights that can be tested in a more detailed
manner once more data becomes available on both the time dimension and the admission of
more countries to the eurozone.
We proceed in two steps: First, we use a New Keynesian model that contains a new type of
labor market model (see Lechthaler et al., 2010), which has so far not been used for this type
of question, to analyze the eects of labor market institutions on macroeconomic volatilities,
namely those of ination and output. We use the second moments of the model economy to
make theoretical predictions on the eects of ring costs (as they are known to be important
in Europe6) and unemployment benet replacement rates (as they play an important role in
the theoretical debate). Second, we run cross-country regressions on the eects of labor market
institutions on macroeconomic volatilities.
Our analysis delivers the following results. As predicted by our model, there is a negative and
signicant correlation between labor turnover costs and output volatility, and there is a positive
correlation between the replacement rate and output volatility. The picture looks dierent for
ination volatility, where labor market institutions in general do not have a great explaining
power. We can rationalize this by our theoretical framework. Other than for output volatility,
the eects of labor market institutions on ination volatility depend on whether aggregate
supply or demand shocks are at work.7 When both play an important role, the theoretical
framework would not predict a clear-cut relationship between labor market institutions and
ination volatility.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 shortly describes the underlying
labor market model, used to analyze macroeconomic volatilities. Section 3 presents the second
moments, Section 4 presents the empirical strategy. Section 5 analyzes the connection between
the theoretical and the empirical part and discusses open questions. Section 6 briey concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Intuitive Description
To illustrate the theoretical eects of labor market institutions on macroeconomic volatilities,
we need to choose a model framework that is both suitable for business cycle analysis and rich
enough to capture several labor market institutions. Therefore, we choose a standard New
Keynesian sticky price model (to capture the business cycle dimension) which is enhanced by
a labor market with match suitability shocks and labor turnover costs. The model details are
laid out in Lechthaler et al. (2010) and Faia et al. (2009).8
5The only papers analyzing the impact of labor market institutions on macroeconomic uctuations in a
monetary union are Abbritti and Mueller (2007) and Campolmi and Faia (2010). However, the rst paper
does not contain an empirical part, and the second only focuses on the eects of replacement rates on ination
dierentials.
6Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) show that the evolution of European unemployment can be explained by the
interaction of shocks and labor market institutions. Among the latter, employment protection is signicant in
most of the cases. However, they only consider level eects and not the second moments. The role of labor
turnover costs in macroeconomic models has recently been pointed out by Lechthaler et al. (2010) and Faia et
al. (2009).
7We use shocks to the conduct of monetary policy (i.e., an aggregate demand shock) and productivity shocks
(i.e., an aggregate supply shock). In contrast to ination volatility, the eect of labor market institutions on
output volatility does not depend on the type of shocks.












































Figure 1: Model Structure
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of our model economy. As in the standard New Keynesian
model, households maximize their intertemporal expected utility subject to their budget con-
straint. The wholesale sector acts under monopolistic competition and is subject to quadratic
price adjustment costs  a la Rotemberg. The monopolistic varieties are bundled by the retail
sector. The central bank follows a Taylor rule. In contrast to the standard New Keynesian
framework, we introduce an additional intermediate goods sector to model the labor market
with unemployment.9
Firms and workers in our economy are subject to search frictions. Workers are able to
contact one rm per period (which is one quarter in our discrete-time model) in order to nd
a suitable employer. Once workers have contacted a rm, their suitability is revealed (e.g., by
performing an interview). We model the suitability by assuming an idiosyncratic operating
cost shock, i.e., although all workers produce the same good, some are less suitable because
they produce the good in more costly manner. Employers will only hire those workers with
suciently low operating costs, up to a certain cut-o point. For simplicity, we assume that
employed workers are subject to the same operating cost shocks as entrants. Further, we assume
that the wage is bargained between the median incumbent worker (i.e., the worker who is in
the middle of the idiosyncratic operating shock distribution) and the rm.10
Labor market institutions, namely labor turnover costs and unemployment benets, are
an explicit part of the model. We assume that unemployed worker obtain unemployment
benets (which allows us to calculate a replacement rate). Firms have to pay linear hiring and
ring costs. These assumptions allow us to analyze the eects of labor market institutions on
macroeconomic volatilities.
We deviate from the standard labor market approach, which assumes a time invariant
matching function  a la Pissarides (2000). Indeed, Shimer (2005) shows that the standard
parametrization of a search and matching model is not able the replicate the fact that, for the
United States, the standard deviation of labor market variables (e.g., the job-nding rate and
the unemployment rate) is several times larger than the standard deviation of productivity (or
9The intermediate goods sector is introduced for analytical convenience. See Blanchard and Gal  (2010) or
Faia (2009) for other papers who also use an additional sector to integrate a search and matching model into a
standard New Keynesian framework.
10The model mechanism would be similar under individualistic bargaining. However, our assumption that
incumbent workers do the bargaining is particularly realistic for European economies.
4output).11 Further, when job destructions are endogenous (a hypothesis that is needed in order
to analyze the role of ring costs), Krause and Lubik (2007) have pointed out that the search
and matching model delivers several counterfactual correlations (e.g., a positive correlation
between the job creation rate and the job destruction rate).
For analyzing the eect of labor market institutions on business cycle behavior, it is however
crucial to use a framework that is in line with the stylized business cycle facts. Thus, our
model assumes in contrast to the search and matching theory that the match suitability (i.e.,
the probability of nding a suitable employer, given a contact probability of one) and not
the matching function determines the number of actual matches in the economy.12 This new
modeling approach generates more realistic business cycle statistics, namely, a strong reaction
of labor market variables to aggregate shocks and the right signs for the correlation between
several variables (see Lechthaler et al., 2010, for details).
In sum, our theoretical approach has several advantages: (i) The use of a New Keynesian
business cycle model with a recent new approach of modeling the labor market ensures that we
can generate realistic labor market and business cycle statistics (see Lechthaler et al., 2010, for
details). (ii) Our model contains several European type labor market institutions, which are
the focus of the empirical analysis. (iii) Our labor market institutions are modeled explicitly
and not as short-cut, as in some other papers.13
For brevity, we only show the labor market equations. All other parts correspond to an
absolutely standard New Keynesian business cycle model. The entire set of equations can be
found in the Technical Appendix.
2.2 The Labor Market
2.2.1 Idiosyncratic Shocks and Labor Turnover Costs
Intermediate goods rms (which sell their products to wholesale rms) hire labor to produce
the intermediate good Z. Their production function is
Zt = AtNt; (1)
where A is the level of technology and N is the number of employed workers. The parameter
A is subject to temporary technology shocks with an autoregressive component, a, and the
standard deviation . Intermediate goods producers are price takers in a perfectly competitive
environment, and sell their products at the relative price MCt = Pz;t=Pt, where Pz is the
absolute price of the intermediate good and P is the economy's overall price level.14
As described before, unemployed workers have to nd a suitable employer. Once they are in
contact with an employer, the match suitability is revealed. The match suitability is modeled as
idiosyncratic operating cost shock, "t, at the beginning of the period, which can be interpreted
as an idiosyncratic shock to workers' productivity or as a rm-specic idiosyncratic cost shock.
The rms learn the value of the operating costs of every worker at the beginning of a period
and base their employment decisions on this value, i.e., an unemployed worker associated with
11Gartner et al. (2009) show for Germany that the standard deviation of labor market variables is also several
times larger than the standard deviation of productivity or output.
12In the search and matching model with endogenous separations, under certain timing assumptions the match
suitability may also play a role for new matches. However, the way the model is conventionally parametrized,
this role is minor.
13One example is Blanchard and Gal  (2010) who model the more sclerotic European labor market vis- a-vis
the U.S. labor market. For being able to obtain analytical solutions, they do not model any ring costs and
heterogeneous match suitabilities. Instead, they generate sclerotic European labor markets, by assuming a
smaller exogenous separation rate, a larger disutility of labor and a larger marginal hiring cost than in the
United States.
14MC is the marginal cost for the wholesale sector.
5a suciently favorable shock will be employed, while an employed worker associated with a
strong enough negative shock will be red.15 However, hiring and ring is not costless. Firms
have to pay linear hiring costs, H, and linear ring costs, F, both measured in terms of the
nal consumption good. These hiring and ring costs drive a wedge between the hiring decision
and the ring decision. In their presence, the retention rate (i.e., 1 minus the ring rate) is
always higher than the hiring rate (see Figure 2 in Lechthaler et al., 2010).
Indeed, each incumbent worker generates the following prot:















where  is the separation probability, Et("t+1j(1   t+1)) the expected value of operating costs
for an incumbent worker (i.e., conditional on retention), and t;i the stochastic discount factor
from period t to i (i.e., the subjective discount factor  weighted with the respective periods'
marginal consumption utility). W=P is the real wage, which is determined in a Nash bargain
between rm and employed workers (see below).
Unemployed workers are hired whenever their operating cost does not exceed a certain
threshold, such that the protability of a worker is higher than the hiring cost, i.e., ~ I;t("t) > H.
Thus, the hiring threshold, h;t, (the value of the operating cost at which the rm is indierent
between hiring and not hiring an unemployed worker) is dened by
~ I;t(h;t) = AtMCt   Wt=Pt   h;t + Et(t;t+1~ I;t+1) = H. (3)
Unemployed workers whose operating cost is lower than this value are hired, while those
whose operating cost is higher are not. The resulting hiring probability is given by
t =  (h;t), (4)
where   is the cumulative density function of " from  1 to the cut-o point h;t.
The rm will re a worker whenever ~ t("t) <  F, i.e., when the operating costs are so high
that it is more protable for the rm to pay the cost of ring the worker. This denes the ring
threshold, f;t (the value of the operating cost at which the rm is indierent between ring
and retaining the worker), as
~ I;t(f;t) = AtMCt   Wt=Pt   f;t + Et(t;t+1~ I;t+1) =  F. (5)
Thus, the separation rate is
t = 1    (f;t). (6)
We thus obtain the usual employment dynamics curve
nt = nt 1(1   t   t) + t, (7)
where n is the employment rate.
15For simplicity, we assume that there are identical operating cost shocks for entrants and incumbent workers.
Note, however, that it would also be possible to have constant productivity for incumbent workers (see, e.g.,
Gartner et al., 2009). But as we want to analyze the eects of ring costs, we need to model job destruction
endogenously.
62.2.2 Wage Bargaining
The real wage is the outcome of a Nash bargain between the median incumbent worker and her
rm, and is renegotiated in each period t.16 When both parties agree, the worker receives the
real wage Wt=Pt and the rm receives the expected prot AtMCt   Wt=Pt   "I in each period
t. When they disagree, the worker's fallback income is Bt, assumed for simplicity to be equal
to the real unemployment benet. The rm's fallback prot assumed to be equal to  S, which
is the cost of not producing.17 Consequently, the Nash-product is
 = (Wt=Pt   Bt)
  
AtPz;t + S   Wt=Pt   "
I1 
; (8)
where  represents the bargaining strength of the incumbent worker relative to the rm. Max-
imizing the Nash product with respect to the real wage, yields the following equation:
Wt=Pt = 
 




+ (1   )B. (9)
Further details on the wage bargaining and the rest of the model can be found in Lechthaler
et al. (2010) and Faia et al. (2009).
2.3 Frictional Labor Market and Marginal Costs
It is well-known that the loglinearized Phillips Curve in the standard New Keynesian model
looks as follows:




where  is the ination rate, mc are the marginal costs, " is the elasticity of substitution between
dierent goods types (in the monopolistically competitive sector) and 	 is the Rotemberg
adjustment cost parameter. In a model with frictionless labor market and constant returns to
scale, the marginal costs are equal to the wage divided by productivity.
In our model, marginal costs are determined by the wage (as in the standard model), the














In this context, marginal costs depend on two additional components (besides wages),
namely the marginal workers' hiring threshold, h;t, and the expected future prots of an
average worker, Et(t;t+1~ I;t+1("t+1)). These two components vary endogenously and drive a
wedge between marginal costs in a frictionless economy and an economy with labor turnover
costs.
As a consequence, each macroeconomic shock (e.g., a productivity shock) is associated with
an endogenous cost-push shock, as it varies the hiring and ring thresholds. Put dierently,
whenever an aggregate shock leads to an expansion of the economy, the cost of production
increases for intermediate goods producers, as they will also have to hire (or retain) workers
that are less suitable (i.e., the hiring threshold, h;t, will increase endogenously). This issue
will become important when we discuss the eects of labor market institutions on ination
volatility and the associated role of aggregate demand and supply shocks.
Faia et al. (2009) show that these wedges are very important for optimal monetary policy.
While in the standard model, it is always optimal to stabilize ination to zero when the economy
is hit by productivity shocks, this is no longer the case in the framework with labor turnover
16See, e.g., Gr uner (2010) for a bargaining mechanism in similar spirit.
17There may be a xed cost of production or workers may impose a cost on the rm in case of disagreement.
7costs. Optimal ination volatility is a positive function of labor turnover costs (i.e., monetary
policy should allow for higher ination volatility, the higher the labor turnover costs are). When
employment adjustment becomes more costly, the social planner will face ination costs and
employment adjustment costs. With a more sclerotic labor market, the social planner will be
willing to accept somewhat higher ination costs in order to reduce the employment adjustment
costs.
2.4 Monetary Policy











where t is the gross ination rate,   is the central bank ination target,  { is the steady state
interest rate and !t is an uncorrelated shock term (i.e., there is either an unsystematic deviation
of the central bank from its rule or the central bank cannot control the relevant interest rate
perfectly), with standard deviation !.
2.5 Parametrization
The Rotemberg adjustment costs are set in line with microevidence.18 The elasticity of substi-
tution, ", in the monopolistic sector is set to 10.
In our standard parametrization, we set the values for labor market institutions to represent
a typical eurozone country. Bargaining power, , is set to 0:5 and unemployment benets, b,
are set to 64% of a worker's average productivity (her annual productivity, A, is normalized to
1), i.e., to roughly 70% of the wages. Linear hiring costs are 10% and linear ring costs are 60%
of annual productivity (see Bentolila and Bertola, 1990, Chen and Funke, 2005). The model
is parametrized to represent the labor market ow rates of a typical continental European
economy ( = 0:02,  = 0:2).19 A summary of all parametrization values can be found in Table
1.
Table 1: Parametrization
 0.99 S 0.2879 A 1  1.5
 2 F 0.6 a 0.95 E(") 0
" 10 H 0.1  0.005 sd 0.53
	 104.85 b 0.64 ! 0.0015  0.5
3 Macroeconomic Volatilities: Theory
We use our benchmark parametrization and conduct ceteris paribus analyses for two labor
market institutions (ring costs and unemployment replacement rates) and dierent conducts
18The reduced form parameter in the New Keynesian Phillips curve is the same as with Calvo price staggering
and an average price duration of four quarters.
19A logistic distribution is chosen for the idiosyncratic operating cost shock. The mean, E ("), is normalized
to zero. The dispersion of the distribution, sd , and the fall-back option of the rm under disagreement,  S,
are chosen to obtain the desired ow rates (see Wilke (2005) for the labor market ow rates).
8of monetary policy. This means that we just vary one parameter, keeping all others constant,
and that we analyze how this changes the impulse response functions and the Hodrick-Prescott
(HP) ltered volatilities of output and ination (to make the theoretical exercise comparable to
the empirical exercise, we use a smoothing parameter  = 1;600).20 For illustration purposes,
we show the impulse response functions (IRFs) in reaction to a one standard deviation shock to
productivity, with an autocorrelation of 0:95 and a standard error of 0:005. When we calculate
business cycle statistics (i.e., standard deviation of ination and output), we assume that the
economy is also subject to aggregate demand shocks, namely, interest rate shocks. As usual in
the literature, we model interest rate shocks to be uncorrelated. We assume a standard error
of 0:0015.21
3.1 Dierent Firing Costs
In addition to our standard parametrization, we also set ring costs (FC) to 0.5, 0.7 and 0.8,
keeping all other parameters values constant. Visual inspection of the IRFs (see Figure 2)
shows that higher ring costs clearly reduce the volatility of output after a productivity shock.
The mechanism involved is straightforward. Higher ring costs reduce labor market ows (both
hiring and ring). Therefore, an economy with higher ring costs reacts in a more sclerotic
manner: both the initial job creation in reaction to a positive shock and the rate at which the
output path declines as the shock fades slow down. The view that higher ring costs dampen
output volatility (for a given set of shocks) is conrmed by the business cycle statistics (see
Table 2).





































Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions to a One Standard Deviation Productivity
Shock for Dierent Firing Costs (fc = 0:5;0:6;0:7;0:8).
While the IRFs for the ination rate also point into the direction that higher ring costs increase
volatilities, this view is not necessarily conrmed by the business cycle table, where the picture
20All our graphs are based on a second order approximation. In the business cycel statistics, we divide the
standard deviation by the mean of the respective variable.
21The numbers for the standard error of the productivity shock and the interest rate shock are broadly in
line with de la Croix et al., 2007, and Smets and Wouters, 2003, 2005.
9is less clear. The type of shock matters for ination volatility. This is illustrated by the last
two lines in Table 2.22
Table 2: Volatilities for Dierent Firing Costs
Volatilities FC=0.5 FC = 0.6 FC=0.7 FC = 0.8
Joint Shocks  0.17 0.18 0.14 0.12
Y 1.17 1.14 1.07 0.97
Productivity Shocks  0.16 0.16 0.15 0.12
Y 1.17 1.14 1.07 0.97
Interest Rate Shocks  0.067 0.067 0.069 0.073
Y 0.030 0.025 0.021 0.017
The results for ination volatility can be explained as follows. Ination is a function of the
current and all expected future marginal costs (see equation 10, where the expected ination
term can be substituted out). When a productivity shock hits the economy, this reduces
marginal costs (as each worker can produce more output). As a consequence, rms will hire
(retain) workers that are less suitable (i.e., the marginal worker has higher operating costs).
Thereby, the economy is hit by an endogenous cost-push shock, increasing marginal costs (see
equation 11)
Higher ring costs lead to a more severe immediate endogenous cost-push shock. This can
clearly be seen in Figure 2, where the initial ination reaction even becomes positive when the
ring costs are suciently large.
Thus, a positive productivity shock reduces marginal costs, while the endogenous cost-push
shock increases them. Under low ring costs, the endogenous cost-push shock is moderate and
the eects of the productivity shock are dominant. As a consequence, with low ring costs the
wholesale goods producing sector is able to reduce prices substantially when the shock hits.
However, once the shock starts disappearing, it will increase prices by more. As a consequence,
lower ring costs may lead to larger price uctuations (i.e., more ination volatility) under
productivity shocks.
Under interest rate shocks, the aggregate productivity remains constant. The output expan-
sion will be associated with an endogenous cost-push shock. The more costly the employment
adjustment (i.e., the higher the ring costs), the more severe will be the cost-push shock. As
a consequence, higher ring costs lead to a faster price adjustment and thereby more ination
volatility.
We can sum up that our model predicts that higher ring costs lead to less output volatility,
irrespective of the shock considered. In contrast, the model cannot make any clear-cut pre-
dictions for the eects of ring costs on ination volatility. The eects depend on the relative
magnitude of aggregate demand vis- a-vis aggregate supply shocks.
3.2 Dierent Replacement Rates
In addition to our standard parametrization, we also set the steady state unemployment re-
placement rate (RR) to 0.65, 0.675 and 0.725, keeping all other parameters values constant. As
shown in Figure 3, the impulse response functions indicate that higher unemployment benet
replacement rates (measured as the unemployment benets divided by the wage in the steady
state) increase the output volatility. This can also be clearly seen in Table 3.
22Obviously, under our chosen calibration (which is in line with estimated dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium models), the productivity shock is dominant in driving aggregate uctuations. If we gave a more important
weight to the interest rate shock, ination volatility may depend positively on ring costs.
10In our model, higher unemployment benets increase workers' fallback position. This has
two eects: (i) The wage in the economy increases. Thus, higher unemployment benets
increase job destruction and reduce job creation, thereby pulling in dierent directions (the
former makes the labor market more uid, while the latter has the opposite eect). (ii) When
the net replacement rate (B=W)23 increases, a larger share of the wage is x (see equation 9).
This reduces the relative uctuations of the wage (for a given variation of the marginal costs,
MC). Thus, we expect that the reduced wage uctuations increase the output uctuation.
And this view is conrmed by the second moments in Table 3.




































Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions to a One Standard Deviation Shock for
Dierent Replacment Rates (RR = 0:65;0:675;0:7;0:725).
Similar to ring costs, the eect of unemployment benets on ination volatility depends
on the type of shock (see Table 3). Higher unemployment benets may imply higher ination
volatility under aggregate supply shocks (i.e., productivity shocks in our case), while they imply
lower ination volatility under aggregate demand shocks (i.e., interest rate shocks in our case).
The intuition is the same as for dierent ring costs. Under aggregate productivity shocks
and low replacement rates, the reduction of marginal costs (due to productivity shocks) and
the increase of marginal costs (due to the endogenous cost-push shock) move into opposite
directions. However, under interest rate shocks, there is no countervailing eect that reduces
marginal costs. Thus, if aggregate demand shocks are dominant in the economy, higher un-
employment benets imply lower ination volatility. If aggregate supply shocks are dominant,
the opposite may be the case. Thus, our model cannot make any clear-cut predictions for the
eects of replacement rates on ination volatility.
23P is equal to 1 in the steady state.
11Table 3: Volatilities for Dierent Unemployment Benets
Volatilities RR = 0.65 RR=0.675 RR = 0.7 RR = 0.725
Both Shocks  0.15 0.15 0.18 0.20
Y 0.65 0.72 1.15 1.41
Productivity Shocks  0.12 0.11 0.16 0.20
Y 0.65 0.72 1.14 1.41
Interest Rate Shocks  0.10 0.09 0.07 0.05
Y 0.000 0.005 0.025 0.029
3.3 Dierent Monetary Policy Rules
Table 4 shows the volatility of model economies with the same aggregate shocks (productivity
and interest rate shocks) and the same labor market institutions, but dierent weights on
ination in the Taylor rule. It can be seen that dierent monetary policy rules change volatilities
substantially, potentially reversing the impact of dierent labor market institutions. Therefore,
we consider the eurozone to be particularly suitable for a case study, as all its members are
subject to the same monetary policy.
Table 4: Volatilities for Dierent Weights in the Taylor Rule
Volatilities = 1:01 = 1:5 = 2
Both Shocks  0.98 0.18 0.13
Y 0.60 1.14 1.18
3.4 Summary of the Theoretical Predictions
Our employed theoretical framework predicts a negative correlation between the magnitude
of ring costs and output volatility in an economy. Further, it predicts a positive correlation
between the replacement rate and output volatility. The predictions for the connection between
the two labor market institutions and ination volatility are less clear, as they depend on
whether aggregate demand or supply shocks are the dominant source of aggregate uctuations
in an economy. If the economy is mainly driven by aggregate supply shocks, the predicted
correlations are the same as for output volatility, while they are the opposite if aggregate
demand shocks are dominant.
Since we are interested in the eects of labor market institutions, we employed a theoreti-
cal business cycle framework with frictional unemployment. Under this framework, a dierent
conduct of monetary policy (e.g., dierent reactions to ination) leads to radically dierent
ination and output volatilities. Therefore, the European Monetary Union (EMU) is the nat-
ural choice for our empirical part. The EMU contains a set of countries with substantially
heterogeneity in the design of the labor market institutions. Further, all these countries are
subject to the same monetary policy, thereby preventing distortions from this source, and they
faced a fairly synchronized business cycle during our chosen observation period.
124 Macroeconomic Volatilities: Empirics
4.1 Indicators and Data Sources
4.1.1 Macroeconomic variables
Our empirical analysis of the eurozone covers 11 countries24 and a time span of nearly ten years,
from the rst quarter of 1999 to the second quarter of 2008. Just like in the simulations above,
we focus on the movements of output and ination25, on a quarterly basis.
Output is measured using real GDP, taken from the IFS (Issue 10/2008), and ination is
measured using the GDP deator26 from the same database. All time series are seasonally
adjusted. To assess the cyclical behavior of output, we consider the output gap, i.e., the
percentage deviation of the time series from its trend, calculated using an HP lter (with
 = 1;600). For ination, we simply consider the cyclical component of the series (the dierence
between the series and its trend, computed using the same lter).27 Volatility is dened as the
standard deviation of these two cyclical measures.
4.1.2 Labor Market Institutions
We use the OECD's (2004) employment protection legislation measure (EPL) to model labor
turnover costs (LTC). This index is calculated as a weighted average of measures for the protec-
tion of regular workers against individual dismissals, requirements for collective dismissals, and
regulation of temporary employment.28 Compared with other measures, such as the employ-
ment legislation index created by Botero et al. (2004), or the hiring and ring costs calculated
in the World Bank's \Doing Business" studies (2008), the EPL both covers a larger range of
relevant aspects of LTC and is computed in a more precise and dierentiated way. The OECD
published EPL gures only once in our observation period, for the year 2003.
A rst graphical inspection of the EPL measure plotted against the volatility of the output
gap (VOG), as shown in Figure 4, reveals a negative correlation, signicant at a 5% level.
Moreover, the relationship appears to be tted best by a hyperbola, so that there may be some
evidence for it being nonlinear.
The generosity of unemployment benets can be measured by replacement rates, which are
also established by the OECD (2007). It denes the net replacement rate (NRR) as the ratio
between net income while out of work and net income while in work. By taking a simple average
of the NRR over 60 months of unemployment, for four dierent family types, and two dierent
income levels, a \synthetic overall measure of the generosity of benets relative to net earnings"
(OECD (2007), p. 99) is obtained. This measure is calculated in two specications (with
and without taking into account social assistance) and has been published yearly since 2001.
Previously, the OECD had also established a gross replacement rate (GRR), covering a much
longer time period (1961{2005). Computed similarly to the NRR, it neglected nevertheless a
certain number of elements, such as taxes or family-related benets, and should therefore be
less precise. For our analysis, we thus retain the NRR (including social assistance), but we
24The 12 founding members, excluding Luxembourg, due to a lack of labor market indicators.
25Employment uctuations have also been considered. However, the data is less reliable due to more structural
breaks and changes in the unemployment denitions.
26The GDP deator is more in line with the theoretical framework than the CPI, because the former only
includes domestically produced goods, i.e., goods that are subject to domestic price rigidities.
27The ination gap may be indenite if the trend is equal to zero. Therefore, we do not choose percentage
deviations. However, our theoretical predictions would be unaected by this transformation.
28The inclusion of the regulation of temporary employment is important. First, it was in the focus of labor
market reforms during our observation period. Second, large hiring and ring costs for regular workers may
cause rms to use temporary work agencies (see, e.g., Chen and Funke, 2009).









































































Linear, R² = 0.47












Figure 4: EPL and the Volatility of the Output Gap
also consider the GRR, for comparison and robustness purposes. As for the EPL, we use the
values in 2003 for the NRR. For the GRR, we use the simple average of its values in the period
1999-2005.29








































































Linear, R² = 0,30











Figure 5: NRR and the Volatility of the Output Gap
When we plot the NRR against the volatility of the output gap (see Figure 5), there is a
positive correlation, although it is weaker than the one found for the EPL, being signicant
only at a 10% level. Again, there may be some evidence for a nonlinear relationship.
Finally, when we plot the EPL against the ination volatility (see Figure 6), there is a
29Using the GRR's value in 2003 does not aect the results. In fact, with the exception of the Netherlands,
countries' GRR is almost stable during the period under consideration.
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Linear, R² = 0.28











Figure 6: EPL and the Volatility of the Cyclical Component of Ination
weak negative correlation. There is virtually no correlation between the NRR and the ination
volatility (see Figure 7).
4.1.3 Control variables
As labor market institutions are of course not the only possible source of dierences in macroe-
conomic volatilities, we choose a set of control variables. Following the choices made by Rumler
and Scharler (2009), we choose the average real GDP per capita (GDPPC), the volatility of
government expenditure (VGE), the volatility of terms of trade, the volatility of import prices,
union density and the coordination of the wage-setting process. Additionally, we also take into
account the average quarterly growth rate (GROWTH), the average real GDP (to control for
size eects), and the average quarterly ination rate. Table 6 shows the coecients of corre-
lation between these control variables with either the volatility of ination or output (if they
are at least signicant at the 10 percent level).30
Table 5: Control Variables




Explanations: *** signicant at 1%, ** signicant at 5%, * signicant at 10%.
30We also experimented with dierent control variables for the country specic nancial system (such as
the private credit by deposit money banks/GDP, bank deposits/GDP, bank concentration, stock market total
value traded/GDP, a dummy variable bank or market oriented banking system). However, they all showed no
signicant correlation with output and ination volatility. Thus, we do not show them in our analysis. Further,
we experimented with loan-to-value ratios, as proposed by Bertola and Koeniger (2007). They also showed no
signicant relations with output and ination volatility. Results are available on request.
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Figure 7: NRR and the Volatility of the Cyclical Component of Ination
Data sources and details on the computation of the control variables, as well as more precise
information on all macroeconomic and labor market variables can be found in the Appendix.
4.2 Estimations
4.2.1 Output Gap Volatility
In this section, we look at a simple regression model, considering the joint impact of labor
turnover costs, replacement rates, a possible interaction between the two, and control variables
on the volatility of the output gap. This model has thus the form:
V OGi = 0 + 1LTCi + 2RRi + 3 (LTCi  RRi) + 4Controli + "i (13)
As we have two dierent measures for replacement rates (NRR and GRR), this gives us two
dierent models to estimate. The limited amount of observations does not allow a large number
of control variables. As indicated by Table 6, the only control variable that is signicantly
correlated with VOG is GDP per capita (GDPPC). Thus, we use this variable in our estimations.
The model is estimated with an OLS step-down regression procedure, eliminating at each
step the least signicant variable, until only variables with a signicance level below 5% are
left. In all results shown below, the specication of the reduced model could not be rejected at
a 5% level, using a general F-test, showing that the dropped variables can indeed be omitted.
16Table 6: Output Volatility: Linear Results
Model 1 Model 2
Constant 10.761*** 5.941***





Control GDPPC -0.112** -0.093**
R2 0.87 0.85
R2 (adj) 0.78 0.79
F-Stat. 9.70*** 13.30***
Explanations: *** signicant at 1%, ** signicant at 5%, * signicant at 10%.
The results, shown in Table 7, indicate a high overall t for the two models. The interaction
terms are found to be signicant, indicating that the impacts of labor market institutions are
not independent from one another.
EPL is signicant in both specications, and as hinted by our initial graphical analysis,
it is negatively correlated with VOG (as NRR and GRR are both always between 0 and 1).
Moreover, an increase of EPL by one standard deviation (0.575) would lower output volatility
by between 0.42 and 1.60 percentage points in the rst, and 0.54 and 0.72 in the second model,
showing that the variable is not only statistically, but also economically relevant.31
Replacement rates, which are less correlated with VOG, are also found to be signicant.
As predicted by theory, higher replacement rates are generally correlated with higher output
volatility. This is always the case in the model using the GRR measure, where an increase of
one standard deviation (0.089) increases output volatility by between 0.11 and 0.29 percentage
points. When using the NRR, the impact of the replacement rate depends on the level of labor
turnover costs: it is positive in the case where EPL is larger than 2.23 (which is the case for
8 out of the 11 countries of our sample), and negative elsewhere. In sum, its impact (after an
increase by one standard deviation (0.223)) ranges between a 0.59 percentage point decrease
and a 0.82 point increase of output volatility.
Thus, while the impact of labor turnover costs appears unambiguous, that of replacement
rates, though generally positive, is less important and depends in a stronger way on interaction
eects.
Finally, the control variable GDP per capita is signicant. Higher GDP per capita seems
to be correlated with lower output volatility, a result that is in line with other studies, such as
Beck et al. (2006).
However, even though those models are signicant, graphical analysis suggested that a
linear relationship between the explaining variables and VOG may not always be the most
appropriate specication. Therefore, we estimated the two models above again, using nonlinear
transformations of the explanatory variables (either hyperbolic, i.e., using 1=X instead of X as
explanatory variable, or quadratic, i.e., using X2).32 Results are shown in Table 8. To a large
extent, they conrm those of the linear models, indicating their robustness.
31The standard deviation of the explained variable VOG is 0.33.
32The variable chosen was the one found to be most signicant in an individual regression, using X as the
only explanatory variable. There was always at least one of the two non-linear specications that gave better
results than the linear one.
17Table 7: Output Volatility: Nonlinear Results
Model 1 Model 2
Constant -3.795** 0.316
LTC 1/EPL 13.875*** 2.025***




Control GDPPC^2 -0.00002*** (dropped)
R2 0.93 0.78
R2 (adj) 0.88 0.72
F-Stat. 18.68*** 13.79***
Explanations: *** signicant at 1%, ** signicant at 5%, * signicant at 10%.
EPL is again signicant in both models, as a volatility-reducing factor. Its economic impact
is smaller than in the linear models (raising EPL by one standard deviation, starting from its
mean value, lowers the volatility by between 0.11 and 0.75 percentage points in the rst model,
and by 0.11 in the second one). The results for replacement rates are somewhat weaker, as their
impact is always positive only in the case where the GRR is used (in this case, the impact of an
increase of one standard deviation, starting from the mean GRR, increases output volatility by
0.06 percentage points). When the NRR is used, the impact is positive only when the threshold
of an EPL of 2.24 is passed (which is again the case for 8 of the 11 countries of our sample).
When considering these results, one should obviously have in mind that the available dataset
is limited, both regarding the number of countries included and the number of years considered
for the volatility calculations. Therefore, our results should be seen as giving a rst insight
of the relative importance of the dierent variables, rather than a denitive conclusion. This
rst insight we obtain from our data suggests the following analysis: labor turnover costs,
such as modeled by the EPL index, appear to be the most important labor market institution
explaining the dierences in output volatility in the eurozone. Indeed, in all the specications
of our model, EPL is statistically signicant, and has a signicant economic impact, higher
EPL being correlated with lower volatility. Replacement rates seem to have a (positive) impact
on output volatility, even though it is weaker and depends in a stronger way on interaction
eects. Overall, the empirical results are in line with our theoretical analysis.
4.2.2 Ination Volatility
For ination volatility, we estimate a model of the following form:
V ICi = 0 + 1LTCi + 2RRi + 3 (LTCi  RRi) + 4Controli + "i. (14)
We use the same step-down regression procedure as in 4.2.2. As seen in Table 6, there are
two control variables that show some signicance, but because of the limited sample, we do not
integrate both into the estimated equations. As volatility of government expenditure (VGE) is
most signicant individually, and dominates average growth in a joint regression33, we choose
to use only this control variable. The results for a linear specication are shown in Table 8.
33When estimating the model V ICi = 0 +1GROWTHi +2V GEi +"i , only VGE is signicant (at a 10%
level).
18Table 8: Ination Volatility: Linear Results
Model 1 Model 2
Constant -0.042 3.323**





Control VGE 0.350*** 0.380***
R2 0.60 0.82
R2 (adj) 0.55 0.70
F-Stat. 13.33*** 6.92**
Explanations: *** signicant at 1%, ** signicant at 5%, * signicant at 10%.
The results depend on the model that is used: when considering the NRR for measuring
replacement rates, all labor market variables drop out of the regressions, and we only nd
a signicant positive correlation between ination volatility and the volatility of government
expenditure. When using the GRR, however, the labor market variables seem to matter, and
their impact depends in a strong way on interaction eects, the impact of EPL and GRR being
positive or negative according to the values of the respective other indicator. The only constant
nding in these estimations is that governments spending rules (or shocks) seem to matter, as
theory would also predict.34
Table 9: Ination Volatility: Nonlinear Results
Model 1 Model 2
Constant 0.172 0.172





Control VGE^2 0.121*** 0.121***
R2 0.62 0.62
R2 (adj) 0.58 0.58
F-Stat. 14.81*** 14.81***
Explanations: *** signicant at 1%, ** signicant at 5%, * signicant at 10%.
In sum, our empirical results do not permit to conclude on the relationship between labor
market variables and ination volatility. They only indicate that government spending shocks
seem to be a decisive feature. All these ndings can be rationalized by our theoretical model.
5 Theory, Empirics and Open Questions
The empirical analysis conrms the theoretical prediction that larger ring costs are associated
with lower output volatilities, while larger replacement rates are associated with higher output
34See Rother (2004) for the eect of government spending on ination volatility. The same would be true if
we integrated government spending shocks into our model.
19volatilities. The empirical analysis is inconclusive with respect to the role of ring costs and
the replacement rate on ination volatility. This can be rationalized by the theoretical analysis
when both aggregate and supply shocks contribute substantially to business cycle uctuations.35
Our analysis has the following implications:
- Interestingly, the standard search and matching model does not necessarily predict the
same qualitative eect of higher labor turnover cost on output volatility. Silva and Toledo
(2009, p. 93-94) "argue that introducing post-match labor turnover costs in the standard
DMP [Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides] matching model with endogenous job destruction helps
increase the labor market volatility in response to labor productivity shocks of reasonable
magnitude." Obviously, this prediction from the DMP model would stand in contrast to what
we found in the eurozone data, and the question why our model and the DMP model generate
dierent predictions needs further investigation.
- The empirical part point towards some nonlinearities and interactions in the correlation
between labor market institutions and macroeconomic volatilities. However, currently we are
unable to map them into our model, as the OECD employment protection legislation numbers
are indices, but not the actual costs of ring a worker (as in the model). Current attempts of
the OECD to calculate actual ring cost numbers may allow to move further into this direction.
- As monetary policy may have a substantial eect on macroeconomic volatilities, we have
chosen the eurozone as a natural experiment to be studied. Theory conrms that we can
expect substantial volatility dierences due to monetary policy. And our rst glance at the
data reconrms this. We have done a correlation analysis for the entire set of OECD countries.
The correlation between labor market institutions and output volatility seems to be a lot less
signicant and stable than within the eurozone.36 Only further econometric research can shed
more light on the role of monetary policy for macroeconomic volatilities.
- As ring costs and replacement rates seem to be important for the propagation of macroe-
conomic shocks, they should be taken into account in quantitative business cycle analysis; par-
ticularly when these labor market institutions are important, such as in European countries.
Up to now, the estimated workhorse medium-scale New Keynesian models assume frictionless
labor markets without unemployment (see, e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2003, 2007) and thereby
ignore the potentially interaction between labor market institutions and the business cycle. The
integration into more detailed models (e.g., multi-country model) may deliver further insights.
- Labor market institutions drive a wedge between the rst best outcome and the actual
outcome. If this wedge is of quantitative importance, these institutions lead to a substantially
distorted equilibrium. As the expected qualitative correlation between unemployment bene-
ts/ring costs and output volatility seems to be of quantitative importance in the data, we
can expect that these institutions are actually welfare relevant for various policies (e.g., mon-
etary and scal policy). So far, there is only little theoretical research on these issues (for one
exception, see Faia et al., 2009). Asymmetric reactions to symmetric shocks imply welfare costs
within a monetary union. Only further theoretical work can provide insights on this issue.
6 Conclusion
This paper shows theoretically and empirically that labor turnover costs and replacement rates
matter for output volatilities within the eurozone. The former has a dampening eect, while
the latter increases output volatility. Although the empirical results are based on a small
dataset, they oer rst insights into how heterogeneous labor market institutions act in a
35This would be in line with Smets and Wouters (2003) where both aggregate supply and demand shocks
play a role in driving the European business cycle.
36Rumler and Scharler's (2009) paper points exactly into the same direction. They write that employment
protection legislation appear to play a limited role for output volatility.
20monetary union. This has important implications for the ability of labor market models to
replicate macroeconomic volatilities and for the type of labor market institutions that should
be integrated into business cycle models.
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7.1 Theoretical Model
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There are two breaks in the IFS time series for real GDP and the GDP deator. In Austria,
a break in the rst quarter of 2000 is notied in the database. In Belgium, there is no such
indication, but in the rst quarter of 2008, the time series evolve in a peculiar way (quarterly
growth rate of over 13%, quarterly deation rate of 9%) that is not matched by other data
sources. Because of these breaks, our Austrian time series does not begin until the rst quarter
of 2000, and the Belgian one stops in the fourth quarter of 2007. Additionally, some countries
did not report data for all the quarters of the observation period: thus, the year 1999 is missing
for Greece, the second quarter of 2008 is missing for Portugal and the Dutch GDP Deator,
and the two rst quarters of 2008 are missing for Ireland.
7.2.2 Labor Market Institutions
For the computation of the OECD's EPL index, the sub-indicator for the regulation of individ-
ual dismissals takes into account the associated procedural inconveniences, notice periods and
severance pay for workers with a dierent number of years of service, and their possibilities for
contesting dismissal and obtaining compensation and reinstatement. Collective dismissals are
assessed by the scope of their legal denition and the additional requirements and costs they
cause for employers. Finally, regulation of temporary contracts is measured by the range of
jobs for which such contracts are legal, the restrictions on their renewal and their maximum cu-
mulated duration37. Further information on the EPL indicators can be found in OECD (1999),
where the index was rst established.
Because it covers a large number of relevant aspects, the NRR appears to be the best
indicator of the generosity of unemployment benets. Nevertheless, Italy seems to be an outlier
with this measure: even when including social assistance, replacement rates are extremely low
(only 5.4% in 2003, driven by the long-term unemployed, who according to the OECD do not
receive benets at all). There is some evidence, laid out for example in Dhont and Heylen
(2008)38 that this gure does not capture the entire nature of the Italian social protection
system. Thus, this is an additional reason for using the GRR as a robustness control. However,
as results for the NRR and the GRR, at least in a model with several explaining variables, are
very similar, the Italian case does not aect our main conclusions.
37The associated weights are 5/12 for protection against individual dismissals and regulation of temporary
employment, and 1/6 for protection against collective dismissals.
38Dhont and Heylen point out that \the gap between Italy and the other European countries is much smaller
than it seems. Although unemployment benets barely exist in Italy, this does not imply a zero fall-back
position. Reyneri (1994) points to the importance of family support as an alternative to unemployment benets.
Furthermore, he emphasizes the existence of invalidity benets as an additional mechanism of public transfers
that the unemployed could receive."
267.2.3 Control Variables
27